Research

Access my current CV here.

Selected Publications

"Selling Out or Standing Firm: Explaining the Design of Civil War Peace Agreements" (with Deniz Cil). 2020 (online first). International Studies Quarterly.

Abstract: When do rebel leaders "sell out" their constituents in the terms of peace by signing agreements that benefit group elites over the rebel constituency, and when do they instead "stand firm," pushing for settlement terms that benefit the public they claim to represent? This article examines variation in the design of civil war settlement agreements. It argues that constituents, fighters, and rebel elites have different preferences over the terms of peace, and that rebel leaders will push for settlements that reflect the preferences of whichever audience they are most reliant on and accountable to. In particular, leaders of groups that are more civilian-reliant for their military and political power are more likely to sign agreements that favor broad benefits for civilian constituents, while leaders who do not depend on civilian support for their political and military power will sign agreements with fewer public benefits. We test this argument using original data on the design of all final peace agreements reached between 1989 and 2009, and several proxies for the group’s level of reliance on civilian supporters. Using a variety of statistical tests and accounting for nonrandom selection into peace agreements, we find strong support for our hypothesis.

"Third Party Actors and the Intentional Targeting of Civilians in War" (with Benjamin Appel). 2019. British Journal of Political Science 49(4): 1453-1474.

Abstract: This article examines the relationship between third-party actors and the intentional targeting of non-combatants in interstate war. It argues that war participants kill fewer civilians in war when their expectation of third-party punishment is high. Combatants will anticipate a high likelihood of third-party sanctions when their alliance and trade networks are dominated by third parties that have ratified international treaties prohibiting the intentional targeting of non-combatants. The study hypothesizes that war combatants kill fewer civilians in war as the strength of ratifiers within their alliance and trade networks increases. Quantitative tests on a dataset of all interstate wars from 1900–2003 provide strong statistical and substantive support for this hypothesis.

“The (In)compatibility of Peace and Justice? The International Criminal Court and Civil War Termination" 2017. International Organization 71(2): 213-243.

Abstract: Does the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) pursuit of justice facilitate peace or prolong conflict? This paper addresses the “peace versus justice” debate by examining the ICC’s impact on civil conflict termination. Active ICC involvement in a conflict increases the threat of punishment for rebel and state leaders, which, under certain conditions, generates incentives for these leaders to continue the conflict as a way to avoid capture, transfer to the Hague, and prosecution. The impact of ICC involvement is conditional upon the threat of domestic punishment that leaders face; as the risk of domestic punishment increases, the conflict-prolonging effects of ICC involvement diminish. I test these theoretical expectations on a data set of all civil conflict dyads from 2002 to 2013. Findings support the hypothesized relationship. Even after addressing potential selection and endogeneity concerns, I find that active involvement by the ICC significantly decreases the likelihood of conflict termination when the threat of domestic punishment is relatively low.

“Led Astray? Leaders and Civil War Duration” 2018. Journal of Conflict Resolution 62(6): 1179-1204.

Abstract: This article examines the impact that rebel and state leaders have on civil war duration. It argues that leaders’ incentives to avoid punishment at the hands of internal audiences and opponents influence their strategic decision-making during war. Specifically, leaders who bear responsibility for involvement in the war have a higher expectation of punishment should they perform poorly, particularly for rebel and high-risk state leaders. As a result, these leaders have incentives to gamble for resurrection, extending ongoing wars in the hope of turning the tide and avoiding punishment. This suggests that civil wars are less likely to end when responsible leaders hold power, especially if the responsible leader is highly vulnerable to punishment. These propositions are tested using original data on all rebel and state leaders involved in civil conflicts between 1980 and 2011. Results support the hypothesized relationship between leader responsibility and war duration.

"Leader Incentives and Civil War Outcomes" 2016. American Journal of Political Science 60(1): 70-84.

Abstract: This article examines the influence that rebel and state leaders have on civil war outcomes, arguing that incentives to avoid punishment influence their strategic decision making during war. Leaders in civil war face punishment from two sources: internal audiences and opponents. I hypothesize that leaders who bear responsibility for involvement in the war have a higher expectation of punishment from both sources following unfavorable war performance, and thus, have incentives to continue the fight in the hope of turning the tide and avoiding the negative consequences of defeat. These incentives, in turn, make leaders who bear responsibility more likely to fight to an extreme outcome and less likely to make concessions to end the war. These propositions are tested on an original data set identifying all rebel and state leaders in all civil conflict dyads ongoing between 1980 and 2011. Results support the hypothesized relationships between leader responsibility and war outcomes.

"International Law and the Consolidation of Peace Following Territorial Changes" (with Paul Huth). 2015. Journal of Politics 77(1): 161-174.

Abstract: Why are some changes to the territorial status quo sustained over time while others are subject to new challenges and ongoing dispute? This paper examines variation in the sustainability of territorial change, arguing that under certain conditions, international law facilitates the consolidation of the new territorial order. Specifically, when international law supports the new status quo, it helps solve enforcement problems associated with international cooperation by generating precedent-based costs for issuing a new challenge. IF a territorial loser has other ongoing territorial disputes in which it enjoys a legal advantage, it will avoid challenging its current loss out of fear that doing so would establish a precedent for non-adherence to the law in territorial settlement and would therefore jeopardize its bargaining strength in other ongoing disputes. We test this argument on an original dataset of territorial changes and settlements during territorial disputes, 1945-2009. Empirical results strongly support our theoretical expectations

"Compliance with International Humanitarian Law: Democratic Third Parties and Civilian Targeting in Interstate War" (with Benjamin Appel). 2014. Journal of Conflict Resolution 54(4): 713-740.

Abstract: This paper examines compliance with the legal principles prohibiting the intentional targeting of noncombatants in interstate war. We argue that the expectation of third party coercion can induce war participants to comply with this body of law. We argue that third party states are most likely to coerce combatants when they have both the willingness and opportunity to do so. Democratic third parties that value the rule of law and human rights possess the willingness to coerce war participants, while strong allies, trade partners, and IGO partners with existing ties to the combatant state have the opportunity to engage in coercion by linking combatant behavior to the provision of benefits or imposition of costs. Based on this logic, we hypothesize that war combatants who have ratified the Geneva/Hague Conventions prohibiting the intentional targeting of noncombatants during war are more likely to comply with the legal obligations included in those conventions when they interact with relatively strong democratic alliance, trade, and IGO partners. In a series of quantitative tests on a dataset of all interstate wars from 1900-2003, we find strong statistical and substantive support for the role of third parties in inducing compliance with the law.

Selected Working Papers:

"Cheap Talk or Costly Commitment? Leader Statements and the Implementation of Civil War Peace Agreements" (with Deniz Cil). R&R.

Abstract: This paper examines how leaders affect the implementation of peace agreements after civil war. We argue that implementation is more likely when leaders have publicly committed to peace. Public commitments tie leaders’ hands, making it costly to back down from peaceful promises. We test this expectation using novel data on the implementation of peace agreements between 1989 and 2014 and original data on public statements by state and rebel leaders. Results show that governments and rebel groups whose leaders have publicly committed to peace are significantly more likely to make progress toward implementation. Furthermore, this effect holds even under conditions that make implementation costly: when implementing difficult provisions, when spoiler risk is high, and when implementation is unreciprocated.

"Battles and Bargains: Escalation, Commitment, and Negotiations in Civil War" (with Elizabeth Menninga). R&R.

Abstract: Why do some civil war negotiations stall, while others build momentum? This paper examines how combatant behavior surrounding prior negotiations influences future negotiations during civil war. We argue disputants learn about the severity of the commitment problem based on whether their opponent escalates or de-escalates violence immediately after negotiations. Escalation intensifies the commitment problem because it is perceived as a sign of bad faith or dissent within the opponent’s ranks over the decision to negotiate. De-escalation, on the other hand, reduces combatants’ fears of exploitation by indicating that the opponent is genuinely interested in dialogue and that the decision to negotiate has broad support within the opponent’s ranks. We hypothesize that escalation after prior negotiations therefore reduces the likelihood of subsequent talks, relative to past de-escalation. In addition, we hypothesize that third-party involvement mitigates the negative effect of prior escalation. We test our expectations on monthly data on civil conflicts in Africa, finding post-negotiation escalation decreases the probability of subsequent negotiations, conditioned on third-party involvement. These findings are robust to a variety of operationalization and model specifications.

"Assessing the Autonomy of International Courts: Situation Selection and Advancement at the ICC" (with Benjamin Appel & Shahryar Minhas). Under Review.

Abstract: The prominence of international courts (ICs) has increased tremendously over the past three decades. As ICs have proliferated and gained new powers, however, debate has emerged over the extent to which they act autonomously from states’ interests. We approach this question by examining situation selection and advancement at the International Criminal Court. We posit that Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) decision-making may be driven by adherence to the ICC’s legal mandate or by the influence of powerful states. Using original data on ICC involvement and a novel estimator that accounts for the sequential nature of ICC activity, we find that neither explanation is fully satisfactory: the OTP acts more in accordance with her legal mandate when initiating preliminary examinations, but power politics plays a dominant role at the formal investigation stage. The paper has several implications for academic and policy work on both the ICC and international courts more generally.