Research
Access my current CV here.
Selected Publications and Working Papers
“The (In)compatibility of Peace and Justice? The International Criminal Court and Civil War Termination.”
(Forthcoming at International Organization)
Does the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) pursuit of justice facilitate peace or prolong conflict? This paper addresses this peace versus justice debate by examining the ICC’s impact on civil conflict termination. Specifically, it argues that active ICC involvement in a conflict (investigation or indictment) increases the threat of punishment for rebel and state leaders, which, in turn, generates incentives for these leaders to continue the conflict as a way to avoid capture, transfer to the Hague, and prosecution. The paper further argues that ICC involvement’s impact is conditional upon the threat of domestic punishment faced by leaders; as the domestic threat diminishes, the conflict prolonging effects of ICC involvement increase. These theoretical expectations are tested on a dataset of civil conflict dyads from 2002 to 2010. Findings are strongly supportive of the hypothesized relationship; even after addressing potential endogeneity concerns, active involvement by the ICC significantly decreases the likelihood that a conflict ends, particularly when the threat of domestic punishment is relatively low.
“Third Party Actors and the Intentional Targeting of Civilians in War.” (with Benjamin Appel)
(Forthcoming at British Journal of Political Science)
Abstract: This paper examines the effectiveness of international law as a constraint on the intentional targeting of noncombatants in interstate war. We argue that the expectation of third party coercion, when sufficiently high, can constrain war combatants, leading to less civilian loss of life. We identify the conditions under which combatant states will anticipate a high likelihood of coercion, demonstrating that third party states are most likely to coerce when they have both the willingness and opportunity to do so. Specifically, third parties who have ratified international treaties prohibiting the intentional targeting of noncombatants possess the willingness to coerce war participants, while allies and trade partners with existing ties to the combatant state have the opportunity to coerce by linking combatant behavior to the provision of benefits or imposition of costs. Based on this logic, we hypothesize that war combatants will kill fewer civilians in war as the proportion of ratifiers within their alliance and trade networks increases. In a series of quantitative tests on a dataset of all interstate wars from 1900-2003, we find strong statistical and substantive support for our argument.
“Led Astray? Leaders and Civil War Duration.”
(Journal of Conflict Resolution)
Abstract: This paper examines the impact that rebel and state leaders have on civil war duration. It argues that leaders’ incentives to avoid punishment at the hands of internal audiences and opponents influence their strategic decision-making during war. Specifically, leaders who bear responsibility for involvement in the war have a higher expectation of punishment should they perform poorly, particularly for rebel and high-risk state leaders. As a result, these leaders have incentives to gamble for resurrection, extending ongoing wars in the hope of turning the tide and avoiding punishment. This suggests that civil wars are less likely to end when responsible leaders hold power, especially if the responsible leader is highly vulnerable to punishment. These propositions are tested using original data on all rebel and state leaders involved in civil conflicts between 1980 and 2011. Results support the hypothesized relationship between leader responsibility and war duration.
"Leader Incentives and Civil War Outcomes"
(American Journal of Political Science 2016)
Abstract: This paper examines the influence that rebel and state leaders have on civil war outcomes, arguing that incentives to avoid punishment influence their strategic decision-making during war. Leaders in civil war face punishment from two sources: internal audiences and opponents. I hypothesize that leaders who bear responsibility for involvement in the war have a higher expectation of punishment from both sources following unfavorable war performance, and thus have incentives to continue the fight in the hope of turning the tide and avoiding the negative consequences of defeat. These incentives, in turn, make leaders who bear responsibility more likely to fight to an extreme outcome and less likely to make concessions to end the war. These propositions are tested on an original dataset identifying all rebel and state leaders in all civil conflict dyads ongoing between 1980 and 2011. Results support the hypothesized relationships between leader responsibility and war outcomes.
"International Law and the Consolidation of Peace Following Territorial Changes" (with Paul Huth)
(Journal of Politics 2015)
Abstract: Why are some changes to the territorial status quo sustained over time while others are subject to new challenges and ongoing dispute? This paper examines variation in the sustainability of territorial change, arguing that under certain conditions, international law facilitates the consolidation of the new territorial order. Specifically, when international law supports the new status quo, it helps solve enforcement problems associated with international cooperation by generating precedent-based costs for issuing a new challenge. IF a territorial loser has other ongoing territorial disputes in which it enjoys a legal advantage, it will avoid challenging its current loss out of fear that doing so would establish a precedent for non-adherence to the law in territorial settlement and would therefore jeopardize its bargaining strength in other ongoing disputes. We test this argument on an original dataset of territorial changes and settlements during territorial disputes, 1945-2009. Empirical results strongly support our theoretical expectations.
"Compliance with International Humanitarian Law: Democratic Third Parties and Civilian Targeting in Interstate War" (with Benjamin Appel)
(Journal of Conflict Resolution 2014)
Abstract: This paper examines compliance with the legal principles prohibiting the intentional targeting of noncombatants in interstate war. We argue that the expectation of third party coercion can induce war participants to comply with this body of law. We argue that third party states are most likely to coerce combatants when they have both the willingness and opportunity to do so. Democratic third parties that value the rule of law and human rights possess the willingness to coerce war participants, while strong allies, trade partners, and IGO partners with existing ties to the combatant state have the opportunity to engage in coercion by linking combatant behavior to the provision of benefits or imposition of costs. Based on this logic, we hypothesize that war combatants who have ratified the Geneva/Hague Conventions prohibiting the intentional targeting of noncombatants during war are more likely to comply with the legal obligations included in those conventions when they interact with relatively strong democratic alliance, trade, and IGO partners. In a series of quantitative tests on a dataset of all interstate wars from 1900-2003, we find strong statistical and substantive support for the role of third parties in inducing compliance with the law.
Selected Working Papers:
"Revisiting the Sustainable Settlement of Civil Wars: Leaders and the Implementation of Peace Agreements" (with Deniz Cil)
Abstract: This paper examines the role that rebel and state leaders play in the implementation of peace agreements after civil war. It argues that implementation will be less likely when leaders who bear responsibility for starting the war (i.e. responsible leaders) remain in power at war’s end, as these leaders are more vulnerable to punishment than their non-responsible counterparts as implementation proceeds. On the other hand, implementation will progress more fully when the leaders who signed the agreement (i.e. signatory leaders) remain in power after war’s end, as changes in leadership can upset the balance of power and bring leaders with different policy preferences to power, both of which incentivize renegotiation of the terms of settlement. We test these theoretical expectations using data on the implementation of comprehensive peace agreements since 1989 and original data on state and rebel leaders involved with these agreements. Results support the hypothesized relationship: non-responsible signatory leaders significantly increase the implementation rate, relative to other leaders. These results have implications for theories about the role of commitment problems and spoilers in civil war settlements: the severity of commitment problems may be leader-specific, and certain types of leaders (i.e. responsible, non-signatory) are most likely to act as spoilers in peace processes.
"Does the ICC have an Africa Problem? Understanding the Determinants of ICC Involvement" (with Benjamin Appel)
Abstract: The International Criminal Court has long been criticized for focusing too much on crimes involving African governments and rebel groups. The empirical record, however, suggests that the ICC has initiated several examinations in states outside the African continent. What explains when the ICC begins a preliminary examination? Does the ICC get involved in those situations most in need of international attention and prosecution – i.e. those situations with the gravest violations of human rights and the least likelihood of domestic prosecution of the perpetrators? Or, alternatively, are the Court’s decisions to investigate influenced by international politics? This paper analyzes the determinants of ICC involvement. We test a legal mandate/institutional incentives argument – that ICC involvement is driven primarily by the severity of human rights violations and the lack of domestic ability or will to prosecute such violations – against a realist/institutional constraints argument – that economic and security relations with leading states, such as the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (P5) impact where the ICC will initiate investigations. Using a variety of measures for both arguments in a country-year analysis from 2002-2012, we find that the ICC's motivations are primarily driven by their legal mandate, and to lesser extent economic relations between states and the P5.
"Not Too Distant: Opportunity, Grievance, and the Onset of Civil War" (with Benjamin Appel)
Abstract: This paper addresses the central limitations in existing scholarship on civil conflict onset, in particular, the fact that neither of the two leading theories of civil conflict – grievance and opportunity – adequately accounts for the timing or location of conflict onset. We argue that this problem stems from a tendency among civil conflict scholars to prioritize either grievance or opportunity, rather than viewing them as complimentary components of a unified theory of the causes of civil conflict. To address this shortcoming, we recognize that both opportunity and grievance are important predictors of conflict onset, and that the real puzzle in this literature should center around explaining how they jointly determine the probability of conflict. To this end, we apply insights from Powell’s bargaining model of war to develop a theory of conflict onset that accounts for the conditional relationship between grievance and opportunity. Specifically, we argue that the probability of civil war will be lowest when grievance and opportunity are at parity, and the probability of war increases as the disparity between opportunity and benefits increases. We directly incorporate the equilibrium condition from Powell’s bargaining model of war into a series of statistical analyses, and find strong statistical and substantive support for our theoretical argument.
Selected Publications and Working Papers
“The (In)compatibility of Peace and Justice? The International Criminal Court and Civil War Termination.”
(Forthcoming at International Organization)
Does the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) pursuit of justice facilitate peace or prolong conflict? This paper addresses this peace versus justice debate by examining the ICC’s impact on civil conflict termination. Specifically, it argues that active ICC involvement in a conflict (investigation or indictment) increases the threat of punishment for rebel and state leaders, which, in turn, generates incentives for these leaders to continue the conflict as a way to avoid capture, transfer to the Hague, and prosecution. The paper further argues that ICC involvement’s impact is conditional upon the threat of domestic punishment faced by leaders; as the domestic threat diminishes, the conflict prolonging effects of ICC involvement increase. These theoretical expectations are tested on a dataset of civil conflict dyads from 2002 to 2010. Findings are strongly supportive of the hypothesized relationship; even after addressing potential endogeneity concerns, active involvement by the ICC significantly decreases the likelihood that a conflict ends, particularly when the threat of domestic punishment is relatively low.
“Third Party Actors and the Intentional Targeting of Civilians in War.” (with Benjamin Appel)
(Forthcoming at British Journal of Political Science)
Abstract: This paper examines the effectiveness of international law as a constraint on the intentional targeting of noncombatants in interstate war. We argue that the expectation of third party coercion, when sufficiently high, can constrain war combatants, leading to less civilian loss of life. We identify the conditions under which combatant states will anticipate a high likelihood of coercion, demonstrating that third party states are most likely to coerce when they have both the willingness and opportunity to do so. Specifically, third parties who have ratified international treaties prohibiting the intentional targeting of noncombatants possess the willingness to coerce war participants, while allies and trade partners with existing ties to the combatant state have the opportunity to coerce by linking combatant behavior to the provision of benefits or imposition of costs. Based on this logic, we hypothesize that war combatants will kill fewer civilians in war as the proportion of ratifiers within their alliance and trade networks increases. In a series of quantitative tests on a dataset of all interstate wars from 1900-2003, we find strong statistical and substantive support for our argument.
“Led Astray? Leaders and Civil War Duration.”
(Journal of Conflict Resolution)
Abstract: This paper examines the impact that rebel and state leaders have on civil war duration. It argues that leaders’ incentives to avoid punishment at the hands of internal audiences and opponents influence their strategic decision-making during war. Specifically, leaders who bear responsibility for involvement in the war have a higher expectation of punishment should they perform poorly, particularly for rebel and high-risk state leaders. As a result, these leaders have incentives to gamble for resurrection, extending ongoing wars in the hope of turning the tide and avoiding punishment. This suggests that civil wars are less likely to end when responsible leaders hold power, especially if the responsible leader is highly vulnerable to punishment. These propositions are tested using original data on all rebel and state leaders involved in civil conflicts between 1980 and 2011. Results support the hypothesized relationship between leader responsibility and war duration.
"Leader Incentives and Civil War Outcomes"
(American Journal of Political Science 2016)
Abstract: This paper examines the influence that rebel and state leaders have on civil war outcomes, arguing that incentives to avoid punishment influence their strategic decision-making during war. Leaders in civil war face punishment from two sources: internal audiences and opponents. I hypothesize that leaders who bear responsibility for involvement in the war have a higher expectation of punishment from both sources following unfavorable war performance, and thus have incentives to continue the fight in the hope of turning the tide and avoiding the negative consequences of defeat. These incentives, in turn, make leaders who bear responsibility more likely to fight to an extreme outcome and less likely to make concessions to end the war. These propositions are tested on an original dataset identifying all rebel and state leaders in all civil conflict dyads ongoing between 1980 and 2011. Results support the hypothesized relationships between leader responsibility and war outcomes.
"International Law and the Consolidation of Peace Following Territorial Changes" (with Paul Huth)
(Journal of Politics 2015)
Abstract: Why are some changes to the territorial status quo sustained over time while others are subject to new challenges and ongoing dispute? This paper examines variation in the sustainability of territorial change, arguing that under certain conditions, international law facilitates the consolidation of the new territorial order. Specifically, when international law supports the new status quo, it helps solve enforcement problems associated with international cooperation by generating precedent-based costs for issuing a new challenge. IF a territorial loser has other ongoing territorial disputes in which it enjoys a legal advantage, it will avoid challenging its current loss out of fear that doing so would establish a precedent for non-adherence to the law in territorial settlement and would therefore jeopardize its bargaining strength in other ongoing disputes. We test this argument on an original dataset of territorial changes and settlements during territorial disputes, 1945-2009. Empirical results strongly support our theoretical expectations.
"Compliance with International Humanitarian Law: Democratic Third Parties and Civilian Targeting in Interstate War" (with Benjamin Appel)
(Journal of Conflict Resolution 2014)
Abstract: This paper examines compliance with the legal principles prohibiting the intentional targeting of noncombatants in interstate war. We argue that the expectation of third party coercion can induce war participants to comply with this body of law. We argue that third party states are most likely to coerce combatants when they have both the willingness and opportunity to do so. Democratic third parties that value the rule of law and human rights possess the willingness to coerce war participants, while strong allies, trade partners, and IGO partners with existing ties to the combatant state have the opportunity to engage in coercion by linking combatant behavior to the provision of benefits or imposition of costs. Based on this logic, we hypothesize that war combatants who have ratified the Geneva/Hague Conventions prohibiting the intentional targeting of noncombatants during war are more likely to comply with the legal obligations included in those conventions when they interact with relatively strong democratic alliance, trade, and IGO partners. In a series of quantitative tests on a dataset of all interstate wars from 1900-2003, we find strong statistical and substantive support for the role of third parties in inducing compliance with the law.
Selected Working Papers:
"Revisiting the Sustainable Settlement of Civil Wars: Leaders and the Implementation of Peace Agreements" (with Deniz Cil)
Abstract: This paper examines the role that rebel and state leaders play in the implementation of peace agreements after civil war. It argues that implementation will be less likely when leaders who bear responsibility for starting the war (i.e. responsible leaders) remain in power at war’s end, as these leaders are more vulnerable to punishment than their non-responsible counterparts as implementation proceeds. On the other hand, implementation will progress more fully when the leaders who signed the agreement (i.e. signatory leaders) remain in power after war’s end, as changes in leadership can upset the balance of power and bring leaders with different policy preferences to power, both of which incentivize renegotiation of the terms of settlement. We test these theoretical expectations using data on the implementation of comprehensive peace agreements since 1989 and original data on state and rebel leaders involved with these agreements. Results support the hypothesized relationship: non-responsible signatory leaders significantly increase the implementation rate, relative to other leaders. These results have implications for theories about the role of commitment problems and spoilers in civil war settlements: the severity of commitment problems may be leader-specific, and certain types of leaders (i.e. responsible, non-signatory) are most likely to act as spoilers in peace processes.
"Does the ICC have an Africa Problem? Understanding the Determinants of ICC Involvement" (with Benjamin Appel)
Abstract: The International Criminal Court has long been criticized for focusing too much on crimes involving African governments and rebel groups. The empirical record, however, suggests that the ICC has initiated several examinations in states outside the African continent. What explains when the ICC begins a preliminary examination? Does the ICC get involved in those situations most in need of international attention and prosecution – i.e. those situations with the gravest violations of human rights and the least likelihood of domestic prosecution of the perpetrators? Or, alternatively, are the Court’s decisions to investigate influenced by international politics? This paper analyzes the determinants of ICC involvement. We test a legal mandate/institutional incentives argument – that ICC involvement is driven primarily by the severity of human rights violations and the lack of domestic ability or will to prosecute such violations – against a realist/institutional constraints argument – that economic and security relations with leading states, such as the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (P5) impact where the ICC will initiate investigations. Using a variety of measures for both arguments in a country-year analysis from 2002-2012, we find that the ICC's motivations are primarily driven by their legal mandate, and to lesser extent economic relations between states and the P5.
"Not Too Distant: Opportunity, Grievance, and the Onset of Civil War" (with Benjamin Appel)
Abstract: This paper addresses the central limitations in existing scholarship on civil conflict onset, in particular, the fact that neither of the two leading theories of civil conflict – grievance and opportunity – adequately accounts for the timing or location of conflict onset. We argue that this problem stems from a tendency among civil conflict scholars to prioritize either grievance or opportunity, rather than viewing them as complimentary components of a unified theory of the causes of civil conflict. To address this shortcoming, we recognize that both opportunity and grievance are important predictors of conflict onset, and that the real puzzle in this literature should center around explaining how they jointly determine the probability of conflict. To this end, we apply insights from Powell’s bargaining model of war to develop a theory of conflict onset that accounts for the conditional relationship between grievance and opportunity. Specifically, we argue that the probability of civil war will be lowest when grievance and opportunity are at parity, and the probability of war increases as the disparity between opportunity and benefits increases. We directly incorporate the equilibrium condition from Powell’s bargaining model of war into a series of statistical analyses, and find strong statistical and substantive support for our theoretical argument.
